
































be	programmed	according	 to	 the	 “political”	alternative	 rule	of	 ‘beyond	any	
reasonable	 doubt’,	 which	 should	 be	 extended	 even	 to	 the	 doubt	 in	
interpreting	 the	 law.	Thus,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 opposing	 judicial	 precedents,	 AI	
systems	should	suggest	the	most	favorable	interpretation	for	the	defendant,	
and	 the	 judge	 should	 dissent	 only	 by	 explaining	 why	 he	 does	 not	 hold	
plausible	the	most	favorable	judicial	precedent.	




O	 artigo	 ilustra	 a	 possibilidade	 de	 usar	 a	 IA	 não	 apenas	 como	 um	
instrumento	 para	 verificar	 os	 fatos	 em	 um	 julgamento	 criminal,	 mas	 até	






Atualmente,	 os	 “sistemas	 de	 inteligência”	 desenvolvidos	 para	 tal	 fim	 tiram	
partido	 dos	 precedentes	 judiciais	 como	 base	 de	 conhecimento:	 visto	 que,	
argumenta-se,	 estes	 algoritmos	 em	 um	 Estado	 Constitucional	 não	 podem	
funcionar	com	base	na	regra	estatística	de	“mais	provável	do	que	não”,	mas	
devem	 ser	 programados	 de	 acordo	 com	 a	 regra	 alternativa	 “política”	 de	
“além	 de	 qualquer	 dúvida	 razoável”,	 que	 deve	 ser	 estendida	 até	mesmo	 à	














The	 necessity	 of	 satisfying	 the	 need	 for	 certainty,	 traditionally	 recognized	 as	 an	
indefectible	requirement	that	must	characterize	criminal	law	and	expressed	by	the	principle	
of	 legality	 could	 guide	 the	 jurist	 in	 appreciating	 the	 entry	 of	 AI	 into	 the	 criminal	 system.	
Indeed,	 the	use	of	 algorithms	 could	 lead	 to	 greater	predictability	of	 the	 applicable	 rule	 and	
would	guarantee	judgments	free	from	ideologies,	political	leanings	and	feelings,	often	hidden	
behind	the	judge’s	sentence.		
The	 recourse	 to	 the	 judicial	 precedent	 to	 resolve	 similar	 cases,	 typical	 of	 common	 law	
systems	 but	 increasingly	 established	 in	 practice	 also	 in	 civil	 law	 systems,	 could	 thus	 be	 an	
operation	 entrusted	 to	machine	 learning.	 Starting	 from	 these	 premises,	 this	Article	 aims	 to	
demonstrate	 how,	 to	 date,	 the	 progress	 achieved	 by	 AI	 and	 the	 related	 advantages	 that	 it	
would	 bring	 in	 criminal	 law,	 however,	 risk	 leaving	 in	 the	 background	 the	 respect	 of	 those	
same	principles	of	supranational	and	constitutional	origin	that	would	safeguard	theoretically	
better.	Criminal	 law	is,	 in	 fact,	based	on	specific	guarantees	 in	 favor	of	 the	defendant,	and	a	
“modern”	 legal	 system	based	on	 the	use	of	AI	cannot	allow	any	evasion	of	 such	guarantees,	
first	of	all,	 that	of	 “beyond	any	reasonable	doubt”	 (BARD	standard)2,	 a	corollary	of	 favor	rei	
both	in	Civil	law	and	Common	law	systems.		
















In	 the	 European	 context,	 the	 reasonable	 doubt	 is	 stated	 by	 the	 Article	 6	 of	 Directive	






the	 most	 strengthened	 and,	 therefore,	 statistically	 most	 used	 in	 similar	 cases?	 The	 expert	
















defendant	 selected	 by	 the	 expert	 system.	 Given	 the	 increasing	 de	 facto	 “legitimacy”	 of	 the	
judicial	precedent	as	a	source	of	law	even	in	civil	law	systems,	it	will	highlight	that	the	actual	


























An	 ‘automatic	 justice’	 achievable	with	modern	 technologies	 is	 indeed	 the	 full	 affirmation	of	





to	 a	 univocal	 solution11.	 Indeed,	 the	 easiest	 computerized	 operations	 would	 be	 those	 of	 a	
logical	 nature	 in	 which	 the	 jurist	 makes	 syllogisms	 or	 formal	 reasoning.	 Therefore,	 the	
reasons	 for	 using	 the	 algorithmic	 procedure	 in	 law	 lie	 in	 need	 of	 certainty	 that	 would	 be	
guaranteed	 in	an	easier	way12;	needs	whose	satisfactions	would	require	a	particularly	clear,	
not	ambiguous	and	formal	language	that	only	algorithms	would	guarantee.	





suitable	 for	 computer	 systems.	 Therefore,	 the	 cybernetic	 jurisprudence	 would	 realize	 the	
principle	in	claris	non	fit	interpretatio:	clarity	would	be	guaranteed	by	a	language	of	‘symbols’	
(Cossutta,	2003,	p.	112)	 that	would	break	down	 the	arbitrary	 interpretation	 in	 favor	of	 the	
automatic	implementation	of	law	where	a	protasis	is	inevitably	followed	by	the	same	apodosis	
anytime.	 The	 ‘formalization’	 of	 the	 abstract	 type	 of	 offense	 and	 the	 concrete	 one	 would	
determine	 the	mathematical	 predictability	 of	 the	 juridical	 consequences	 of	 a	 case	 so	much	











181);	 Taddei	 Elmi	 (2014,	 p.	 89).	 See	 Leibniz	 (1935,	 p.	 31),	 which	 believed	 it	 could	 reduce	 all	 human	 reasoning	 to	 a	 kind	 of	
calculation	that	would	serve	to	discover	the	truth,	within	the	limits	of	what	is	possible	ex	datis,	e.g.	considered	what	is	given	or	
known.	In	Leibniz’s	reasoning,	 just	as	the	objectivity	of	numbers	 is	 independent	of	the	mathematicians	themselves,	being	valid	
regardless	of	whether	there	is	something	or	someone	which	counts,	so	law	–	which	operates	through	logic	–	values	regardless	of	
















decisions	 involve	 the	 so-called	 reasoning	 algorithms	 that,	 given	 some	 premises,	 achieve	
conclusions	based	on	 these	premises	 through	 logical	programming	expressed	 in	a	 language	
such	 as	 a	 system	 that	 can	 perform	 automatic	 operations	 based	 on	 that	 preliminary	
knowledge15.	 However,	 the	 reliability	 of	 these	 decisions	 depends	 on	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	
premises,	 i.e.	 the	 database	 used	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 on	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	 procedure	
used16.	
Methods	currently	used	do	not	 try	–	as	 in	 the	past	with	disappointing	results	 (Clément,	
2017,	 p.	 104;	 Ferrié,	 2018,	 p.	 498)	 –	 to	 reproduce	precisely,	 i.e.	 to	 replicate,	 the	process	 of	
human	 thought.	 However,	 they	 are	 defined	 as	 expert	 systems	 based	 on	 knowledge	







However,	 through	 automatic	 learning	 systems	 (machine	 learning),	 they	 produce	 the	
inference	 criteria	 that	 remain	 mostly	 unknown	 to	 the	 programmers	 themselves19.	 The	
reference	is	to	the	so-called	neural	networks	that	can	self-correct	themselves,	getting	models	
from	 the	 so-called	 big	 data,	 operating	 through	 those	 analogical	 procedures	 that	 should	
distinguish	human	 reasoning	 and,	 in	 particular,	 the	 interpretative	 one	 (Di	Giovine,	 2020,	 p.	
952-953).	“After	all,	 these	predictive	algorithms	are	not	built	to	answer	why	a	specific	thing	
will	 happen,	but	only	 to	 indicate	with	 the	greatest	possible	 accuracy,	 the	probability	 that	 it	
will	happen”20.	
In	 the	 legal	system,	 therefore,	 it	can	be	said	that	 the	automated	decision	currently	does	






17	Many	years	ago,	Feigenbaum	defined	an	expert	 system	as	a	program	 for	calculation	 that	 takes	advantage	of	knowledge	and	









19	 Researches	 highlighted	 that	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 algorithms	 is	 not	 conformed	 with	 the	 creation	 and	 explanation	 of	


















This	 process	 of	 automation	 of	 the	 juridical	 discourse,	 it	 would	 be	 said,	 goes	 through	
different	 steps	 of	 artificiality23.	 Some	 products,	 already	 in	 place,	 provide	 very	 advanced	
jurisprudential	research	tools	that	can	rough	out	the	judge’s	possible	leanings24.	Other	tools,	
developed	mainly	 in	 the	academic	 field,	 tend	 instead	to	build	real	decision-making	software	
potentially	able	to	calculate	the	ending	of	a	litigation	and	thus	to	replace	the	judge25.	
Unlike	 traditional	 search	 engines	 which	 are	 even	 more	 advanced26,	 the	 former	 can	
‘understand’	human	language,	 identify	the	correlations	between	words	to	get	their	meaning,	
make	logical	connections,	and	propose	solutions	with	the	probability	of	success	in	litigation27.	
The	 latter,	 decision-making	 software,	 taking	 advantage	 of	 progress	 in	 natural	 language	
processing	 and	 automatic	 learning,	 statistically	 processes	 some	 lexical	 groups	 of	 words	 in	
judgments	to	verify	their	frequency,	but	cannot	identify	the	reasons	for	a	decision	or	make	a	
real	 legal	 analysis.	 Therefore,	 the	 so-called	 reasoning	 algorithm	 cannot	 develop	 legal	
reasoning	 as	 the	 human	 mind	 does,	 but	 rather	 it	 replaces	 the	 judge	 only	 in	 preparing	 a	
decision	 based	 on	 the	 judicial	 precedents.	 It	 is	 also	 evident	 that	 the	 fact	 is	 that	 automatic	
learning	and	analysis	are	more	accurate	than	those	related	to	legal	reasoning.	
The	Authors	of	 these	 researches	 find	 similarity	with	 the	 legal	 realism,	 observing	 that	 «	
«judges	primarily	react	to	the	facts	of	the	case,	rather	than	to	legal	arguments»»28:	ultimately,	
according	 to	 these	 researches,	 the	 judge	 primarily	 ‘reacts’	 to	 the	 fact	 and,	 therefore,	 the	
algorithm	based	on	previous	judicial	decisions	will	also	work	in	the	same	way.	The	success	of	
Compas	 software	 in	 the	 USA	 for	 calculating	 recidivism,	 also	 supported	 by	 American	
 
interpret	 the	 complex	 nature	 of	 decision-making,	 that	 they	 could	 not	 succeed	 in	 producing	 reliable	 models	 of	 the	 judge’s	
reasoning.	These	attempts,	one	might	add,	are	a	good	proof	of	the	impossibility	of	interpreting	such	a	reasoning	in	terms	of	AI.	On	
the	other	hand,	one	may	consider	that	the	decision-making	procedure	is	so	complex,	variable,	uncertain,	fuzzy	and	value-laden,	
that	 it	 could	 never	 be	 reduced	 to	 logical	models.	 Any	 logical	model,	 one	might	 say,	 would	 necessarily	 leave	 aside	 important	









of	 legal	 texts	 and	 whose	 database	 is	 made	 up	 of	 laws,	 Court	 of	 appeal	 and	 Court	 of	 Cassation.	 After	 the	 law’s	 approval	 on	























Apart	 from	 the	 doubts	 about	 its	 actual	 predictive	 capacity,	 highly	 disputed	 (Louden,	
Skeem,	2007),	and	the	perplexity	about	its	legitimacy	due	to	the	risks	of	discrimination30	and	
the	secrecy	of	the	criteria	that	govern	its	 functioning	(Kehl,	Guo,	Kessler,	2017),	 this	system	
deals	 with	 the	 previsions	 of	 future	 facts	 (the	 realization	 of	 crimes)	 based	 on	 past	 facts	
(criminal	 involvement,	 relationships/lifestyles,	 personality/attitudes,	 family,	 and	 social	
exclusion),	therefore	conditions	that	only	marginally	concern	the	legal	argument31.	
On	the	other	hand,	in	this	context,	the	aim	is	to	explore	the	even	more	complex	capacity	of	





Considered	 the	 above	 exposed,	 AI	 in	 Law	 it	 is	 destined	 to	 strengthen	 the	 importance	
assumed	by	previous	 judicial	 precedents,	 at	 least,	 according	 to	 the	 current	 knowledge.	 It	 is	
also	evident	that	if	this	could	be	approved	in	an	easier	way	in	common	law	systems,	it	should	
be	different	 in	 civil	 law	ones,	 such	as	 the	 Italian	one.	 Indeed,	 in	 these	 last	 law	systems,	 the	
judge	 has	 to	 apply	 the	 law	 according	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 strict	 legality,	 but	 in	 practice	 it	 is	
increasingly	 undermined	 by	 the	 recourse	 to	 the	 judicial	 precedents33.	 In	 fact,	 in	 civil	 law	
systems	where	the	use	of	AI	is	more	developed	–	in	Europe,	especially	in	France	–	the	problem	












population	sample.	A	company	owns	 the	rights	and	software	use	 licenses,	 so	 the	algorithm’s	criteria	are	covered	by	 industrial	
secret.	The	Supreme	Court	of	Wisconsis	affirmed	that	the	software	use	does	not	compromise	the	right	to	a	fair	trial:	cf.	State	of	







1043	 ff.).	 See	 also	 O’Neil	 (2016,	 14,40,162),	 which	 argues	 that	 the	 algorithms	 could	 introduce	 the	 bias	 of	 the	 judges	 in	 the	




















between	 the	 fact	 as	 roughed	 out	 by	 the	 rule,	 and	 the	 rule	 itself	 as	 well	 as	 chosen	 and	
interpreted36.	 Thus,	 the	 doctrine	 proposes	 an	 incorporation	 beetwen	 fact	 and	 law37,	
incorporating	 the	 quaestio	 facti	 in	 quaestio	 iuris38.	 Instead,	 the	 ‘factualization’	 of	 the	
algorithmic	law	proposes	a	different	and	inverse	operation:	the	law	becomes	one	of	the	many	
other	 facts	 considered	 by	 the	 algorithm,	 incorporating	 the	 law	 in	 the	 fact.	 All	 this	 would	
determine	 an	 ius	 dicere	 ‘genetic’	 mutation.	 Indeed,	 the	 algorithms	 do	 not	 look	 for	 the	
applicable	rule	according	to	the	traditional	principle	of	“iura	novit	curia”	and	do	not	explain	
why	 judges	 make	 a	 decision	 rather	 than	 another	 but	 merely	 reduce	 the	 ‘judging’	 in	 the	
recourse	to	judicial	precedents39.	So,	this	kind	of	solution	would	be	coherent	with	the	trend	to	
simplify	 the	 explanation	 of	 the	 sentence	 through	 the	 strengthening	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	
precedents,	not	only	in	the	civil	jurisprudence,	but	also	in	the	criminal	one.	If	this	trend	would	
be	implemented	in	an	expert	system	of	AI,	there	would	also	be	the	risk	of	circumventing	the	











Therefore,	 the	 interpretation	almost	always	admits	several	plausible	options,	as	 long	as	
they	 are	 rationally	 well-founded41.	 In	 several	 hermeneutic	 outcomes,	 the	 algorithm	 could	
choose	according	to	the	criterion	of	“more	likely	than	not”,	a	statistical	parameter	that	among	
the	 judicial	 precedents	 selects	 the	most	 consolidated	 and	most	 frequent	 one.	 Indeed,	 it	 has	


















computing	 and	 self-learning	 skills	 and	 it	 is	 able	 to	 catch	 various	 correlations	 among	
information	and	quickly	giving	back	an	answer.		
In	 the	case	of	several	hermeneutic	solutions,	 the	algorithm	–	 in	place	of	 the	 intuition	of	
the	judge	–	could	choose	according	to	the	criterion	of	“more	likely	than	not”,	i.e.,	a	parameter	
that	 selects	 the	most	consolidated	and	most	 frequent	one	among	 the	 judicial	precedents.	 In	
this	 way,	 algorithms	 would	 be	 useful	 to	 calculate	 the	 main	 judicial	 leanings,	 whose	
determination	today	is,	instead,	left	to	the	intuition	of	the	judge42.	
Moreover,	 allowing	 the	 algorithm	based	 on	 judicial	 precedents	 to	 operate	 according	 to	
the	rule	of	“more	likely	than	not”	raises	doubts,	especially	in	Criminal	law43.	In	reality,	among	
several	 interpretative	 options,	 all	 plausible,	 the	 choice	 between	 them	 cannot	 be	 made	
according	to	a	free	conviction	of	the	judge	as	uncritical	intuition,	neither	can	it	depends	on	the	
AI	 statistical	 operations.	 Previous	 research	 outlined	 a	 possible	way	 toward	overcoming	 the	
excessive	discretion	of	the	judge	which	has	allowed	the	jurisprudence	to	give	entrance	to	the	
choices	of	criminal	policy,	ethical	reasons,	feelings	or	ideologies44.	This	way	could	also	find	an	
implementation	 in	 the	 algorithmic	 judgment	 –	 precisely	 concerning	 the	 invalidity	 of	 the	
criterion	of	“more	 likely	than	not”	–	to	attempt	to	remedy	at	 least	 its	most	striking	frictions	
with	some	fundamental	criminal	legal	system	principles45.	




greater	 legal	 certainty,	 understood	 as	 possibility	 of	 predicting	 interpretative	 outcomes	 and	
not	simply	as	pervasive	vis	of	the	punitive	power46.	




point	concerns	the	procedural	side	of	 the	thesis,	closely	related	to	 the	 former.	 Indeed,	since	
crime	is	that	fact	which	corresponds	to	a	legal	type	and	ascertained	according	to	the	rules	of	
the	 Due	 process,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 these	 rules	 contribute	 to	 determining	 crime	 itself:	 the	
substantive	 rule	 of	 favorable	 interpretation	must	 be	 combined,	 from	 a	 procedural	 point	 of	









September,	with	paper	of	De	Francesco,	 Il	 giudice	penale	dirime	ogni	 ragionevole	dubbio,	 spiegando	perché	 le	 opzioni	 contrarie	
vanno	respinte.		




46	 In	 the	American	 legal	 system,	 the	 favorable	 interpretation	 for	many	aspects	 coincides	with	 the	 rule	of	 lenity.	 In	 the	 case	of	
ambiguity	in	legal	texts,	it	provides	the	most	favorable	interpretation	for	the	defendant.	The	reasons	at	the	base	of	this	doctrine,	
whose	 origin	 is	 judicial,	 lie	 in	 the	 greater	 predictability	 of	 the	 decisions	 and	 the	 principle	 of	 the	 separation	 of	 power.	 On	 the	
origins	of	the	rule	of	lenity	and	its	premises,	among	the	others,	see	Scalia	(2018):	Scalia,	Garner	(2012);	Price	(2004,	p.	906-921);	








supporting	 the	 chosen	 hermeneutical	 option	 plausibility48:	 to	 this	 part	 of	 the	 justification	
(pars	costruens)	should	be	added	 that	of	confutation	(pars	destruens),	 i.e.	 the	explanation	of	
the	 reasons	why	 the	most	 favorable	 interpretative	 option	 is	 implausible	 or	 illogical	 and,	 as	
such,	 to	 exclude.	 To	 induce	 choosing	 the	 most	 favorable	 interpretative	 option	 for	 the	
defendant,	it	would	not	be	necessary	that	this	is	the	only	‘right’	one;	rather,	it	is	indispensable	
that	the	interpretation	is	one	of	the	plausible	ones,	excluding	only	those	merely	deceptive	and	
without	 any	 hermeneutical	 value.	 Therefore,	 even	 in	 the	 context	 of	 cultural	 pluralism	
characterized	by	not	absolute	solutions,	the	decision	should	not	base	itself	on	mere	opinion,	
but	 on	 a	 rationally	 valid	 argument,	 on	 a	 qualified	 doctrine	 or	 jurisprudence,	 even	 if	 not	
necessarily	 uncontested	 (Massimo	 Donini,	 2010,	 p.	 1089).	 In	 essence,	 on	 a	 well-founded	
“conflict	of	reasons”(Irti,	2016,	p.	123).	
In	 addition	 to	 serious	 doctrinal	 leanings	 that	 could	 be	 classified	 and	 computerized,	 the	
logical	 procedure	 proposed	 above	 could	 be	 more	 easily	 based	 on	 the	 Supreme	 Court’s	
precedents	useful	to	demonstrate	a	not-implausible	favorable	interpretation49.	That	seems	to	
be	an	appropriate	way	 to	 integrate	 the	role	of	 judicial	precedent	with	 the	principle	of	favor	
rei:	a	kind	of	obligation	to	follow	the	precedent	only	if	in	bonam	partem,	especially	if	it	is	of	the	
Supreme	Court	(Caterini,	2012,	p.	118-129).	
Currently,	 in	 fact,	many	 factors	 –	 as	well	 as	 computerization	 –	 push	 «towards	 a	 lesser	
“obsession”	 with	 the	 written	 law	 as	 the	 exclusive	 reference	 point	 of	nullum	 crimen,	 and	
towards	greater	recognition	of	the	judicial	precedent	as	one	of	the	factors	able	in	producing	
law»	 (Cadoppi,	 2012,	 p.	 97).	 However,	 it	 is	 equally	 necessary	 to	 tend	 towards	 solutions	 in	
which	this	law	in	action	produces	its	effects	only	if	it	is	favorable	to	the	defendant.	Therefore,	
a	kind	of	‘creation’	of	the	law	through	the	judicial	precedent	as	long	as	in	bonam	partem50.	




in	 the	 statistical	perspective	of	 a	knowledge-based	 system	–	 the	one	 calculated	as	 the	most	
consolidated	precedent52.	If	the	judge	cannot	exclude	with	the	explanation	of	the	decision	the	
plausibility	 of	 the	most	 favorable	 precedent	 for	 the	 defendant,	 then	 the	 different	 judgment	
 
48	Cf.	Jellema	(2020,	p.	1-25),	which	argues	that	the	plausibility	of	the	chosen	interpretative	option	depends	on	two	conditions	and	
if	 they	subsist,	 the	BARD	standard	could	be	held	achieved:	“guilt	 is	only	established	BARD	if	(1)	the	best	guilt	explanation	 in	a	
case	 is	substantially	more	plausible	 than	any	 innocence	explanation,	and	(2)	 there	 is	no	good	reason	to	presume	that	we	have	
overlooked	evidence	or	alternative	explanations	that	could	realistically	have	exonerated	the	defendant”.		







Jersey,	 530	 U.S.	 at	 477:	 in	 the	 sentence,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 used	 the	 term	 “elements”rather	 than	 “facts”;	 cf.	 United	 States	 v.	













judgment,	 the	 criteria	 that	 should	 characterize	 it,	 depending	 on	 whether	 developed	 in	 the	
criminal	field	or	not53.	At	this	first	and	partial	conclusion,	it	does	not	seem	an	impediment	that	





interpretation	 of	 the	 law	 (Caterini,	 2019,	 p.	 330-336).	 	 Considering	 that	 the	 observations	
made	concern	only	the	criminal	robotic	judgment	–	because	the	favor	in	case	of	doubt	works	
for	the	defendant	only	in	the	criminal	trial54	–	it	is	now	possible	to	make	a	brief	conclusion55.	






and	principles	of	 legal	 science59,	 thus	avoiding	 cybernetic	 solutions	are	elaborated	by	 some	




The	 functioning	of	an	expert	 system	based	on	 jurisprudential	precedents,	 indeed,	 could	
operate	by	calculating	a	series	of	interpretative	options	from	which	it	should	choose	not	the	
statistically	 most	 frequent,	 but	 the	 one	 most	 favorable	 to	 the	 defendant.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	
 
53	 In	Italy	two	monographs	of	 jurists	which	propose	mathematic	models	to	apply	to	the	 law	stand	out:	Asaro	(2013)	and,	with	
specific	reference	to	the	civil	law,	Viola	(2018).	
54	In	the	civil	legal	system,	the	judge	can	not	restrict	himself	to	not	decide	(non	liquet),	however,	he	has	to	decide	in	favor	of	the	








57	 Just	 the	 judicial	mistakes	 significant	effects	due	 to	heuristics	and	 to	 the	mind	and	cognitive	bias	 of	 the	person	represent	an	
important	premise	to	justify	the	use	of	the	algorithms	in	law;	cf.	Nieva	Fenoll	(2019,	p.	31-46).	
58	For	instance,	in	March	2018,	the	Committee	of	Experts	on	Internet	Intermediaries	of	the	Council	of	Europe	published	the	study	
Algorithms	 and	Human	Rights.	 Shortly	 after,	 considering	 the	 «AI	 increasing	 importance	 in	modern	 society»	 and	 its	 «expected	
benefits	since	its	potentialities	will	also	be	used	at	the	service	of	the	justice’s	efficiency	and	quality»,	the	European	Commission	
for	justice	efficiency	(CEPEJ)	adopted	the	European	Ethical	Charter	on	the	Use	of	Artificial	Intelligence	in	Judicial	Systems	and	their	
environment.	 In	 this	 document,	 several	 reservations	 on	 the	 AI	 used	 in	 Criminal	 law	 are	 expressed,	 limited	 to	 possible	












could	 happen	 only	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 sentence	 of	 acquittal	 or	more	 favorable	 than	 the	 other	
possible	ones63.	Therefore,	it	should	develop	an	algorithm	not	only	technologically	optimized,	
but	 also	 oriented	 to	 precise	 ‘political’	 leanings	 to	 overcome	 the	 mere	 statistical	 data64.	
Philosophy,	after	all,	has	taught	that	technology	is	not	neutral,	but	makes	politics	(Galimberti,	
1999;	 Severino,	 2009).	 Of	 course,	 it	 should	 not	 implicate	 the	 judge’s	 exclusion	 from	 the	
decision-making	process,	but	support	for	the	judge,	a	kind	of	mixture	between	Humanitas	and	
techne	(Carcaterra,	2019),	typical	of	a	defined	“synesthetic”	Criminal	law	(Papa,	2020,	p.	86).	
That	would	be	useful	 to	reduce	 the	response	time	of	 the	 judicial	authority,	 improve	the	
law	implementation	predictability,	and	guarantee	the	judicial	leanings	uniformity65.	Indeed,	to	
achieve	these	objectives,	the	European	Ethical	Charter	on	the	Use	of	Artificial	Intelligence	in	
Judicial	Systems	also	has	not	a	basic	 idea	of	 replacing	 the	 judge,	but	an	auxiliary	 role	of	A.I	
(Simoncini,	2020,	p.	54).	
In	 the	 case	 that	 interests,	 this	 aid	 would	 consist	 in	 indicating	 to	 the	 judge	 the	 most	
favorable	 law	interpretation	to	 the	defendant	derived	 from	the	range	of	 judicial	precedents.	
This	option,	using	computer	language,	should	be	a	kind	of	default	option66.		
If	the	judge,	to	streamline	himself	some	of	that	«effort	in	thinking»	(Carnelutti,	1949,	p.	41	
ff.)	 would	 agree	 with	 this	 cybernetic	 suggestion,	 the	 burden	 of	 explanation	 would	 be	
simplified,	referring	to	the	algorithmic	elaboration	of	the	judicial	precedents.	If,	on	the	other	
hand,	 the	 judge	 would	 opt	 for	 a	 more	 unfavorable	 hermeneutical	 choice	 than	 the	 one	
suggested	by	the	robot,	then	the	burden	of	explanation	should	be	reinforced	in	the	mentioned	
confutative	 meaning67.	 In	 a	 procedural	 perspective,	 legal	 certainty	 is	 seen	 as	 discursive	
rationality	capable	of	opposing	the	supremacy	of	technology68.	Ultimately,	 in	such	cases,	 the	
judge	 can	not	 restrict	himself	 to	 illustrate	only	 the	 reasons	useful	 to	demonstrate	 the	most	







62	 Antoine	 Garapon	 (2018,	 P.	 196)	 observes	 that	 today,	 it	 can	 mean	 that	 digital	 systems	 introduce	 new	 legality,	 that	 finds	








64	Kehl,	Guo,	Kessler	 (2017,	p.	34)	well	highlight	 that	Politics	 that	have	 the	decision	power	have	 to	give	priority	 to	 the	values	
considered	by	the	algorithm,	independently	from	supposed	technical	precision	necessities.	
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